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Abstract
In this paper we assess whether forward guidance for monetary policy regarding
the future path of interest rates is desirable. We distinguish between two cases
where forward guidance for monetary policy may be helpful. First, forward
guidance may reveal private information of the central bank. We argue that
vague, non-binding statements may be desirable. Second, forward guidance may
be used as a commitment device. In this case, policy forecasts may be desirable
in a classic inﬂation-bias framework but not in a New Keynesian framework.
Keywords: central banks, transparency, commitment, Federal Reserve, policy
inclinations, signaling
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There is substantial disagreement among both policy-makers and academics about
the merits of forward guidance for monetary policy. Consequently, practice regarding
forward guidance varies signiﬁcantly across central banks and over time. Many central
banks divulge nothing about the future actions they are likely to take. As documented
by Geraats et al. (2008), the ECB currently uses a traﬃc-light system with diﬀerent
code words in order to signal its likely decisions in the near future. The Federal
Reserve has experimented with diﬀerent practices. In May 1999 it started publishing
a policy bias or policy tilt, but this was discontinued after one year.1 In 2003 the Fed
embarked on a new attempt to issue forward guidance. The central banks of Iceland,
New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden are much more explicit and publish numerical
values for the future path of interest rates.
In this paper we summarize the arguments for and against the desirability of forward
guidance put forward in the literature and assess their validity in the context of various
frameworks. We focus on forward guidance through interest-rate projections. Forward
guidance can serve two purposes, representing either a commitment device or a means
of communication. We point out that there are limits to the communication of private
information through forward guidance. If forward guidance represents cheap talk, the
precision of the information transmitted by the central bank is limited by credibility
problems. If forward guidance is used as a commitment device, a trade-oﬀ arises
between gains from commitment and losses in ﬂexibility.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next two sections we summarize the main
arguments in favor of and against forward guidance. We provide an assessment of these
arguments for diﬀerent scenarios in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1Cf. “The Financial Times”, January 20, 2000, “Fed to No Longer Adopt Policy Bias Toward
Rates.” See also Poole (2003).
22 Arguments in Favor of Forward Guidance
The main argument in favor of publishing information on future policy interest rates
runs as follows:2 Aggregate spending, e.g. ﬁrms’ investment spending, is aﬀected by
long-term interest rates, which only depend on current policy rates to a negligible
extent. However, long-term interest rates are crucially aﬀected by expectations about
the future path of policy rates. Thus by publishing forward guidance for its monetary
policy the central bank may be more successful in aﬀecting aggregate spending in the
desired way.
At a deeper level, the value of the forecasts can be twofold. First, the interest-rate
forecasts might reveal information that has not already been disclosed by other means
of communication. This information may relate to the central bank’s objectives or its
assessment of economic shocks and the functioning of the economy. Second, in the face
of possible time-inconsistency problems, forecasts might be valuable if they enabled the
central bank to aﬀect the public’s expectations in a favorable manner. This argument
requires the central bank to commit to its policy announcements to some extent. How
the central bank can commit to a future course of policy will be taken up in the next
section. For the moment we assume that some commitment is possible.
Why might commitment be desirable? Several potential areas have been identiﬁed
in the literature. First, the classic inﬂation-bias framework of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) involves the central bank targeting a level of
output that exceeds the natural level. As a consequence, the central bank’s ex-ante
optimal policy is diﬀerent from its ex-post optimal policy, therefore commitment is de-
sirable. Second, faced with the danger of deﬂation it may be optimal for a central bank
to convince the public that it will adhere to expansionary monetary policy for some
time. However, if inﬂation gains momentum, the central bank has an incentive to re-
nege on its promise and pursue a less expansionary policy than previously announced.3
2See, for example, Rudebusch and Williams (2006) and Woodford (2007). The arguments in favor
of and against the publication of forward guidance are neatly reviewed in Geraats et al. (2008).
Faust and Leeper (2005) maintain that the most important aspect of central bank transparency is
communication about the future path of the policy rate.
3See, for example, Krugman (1998).
3Third, in the New Keynesian framework presented by Clarida et al. (1999) gains from
commitment are also possible. The central bank would beneﬁt from a commitment
to vigorous shock stabilization in the future. This cushions the impact of shocks on
inﬂation expectations and thus in turn on current inﬂation. However, once the public
has formed its expectations, the central bank may be reluctant to actually pursue the
announced policy. Again there are potential gains from commitment.
3 Arguments against Forward Guidance
To put the arguments against forward guidance into perspective, we begin with a
discussion of complete contingent commitment. If it were possible to commit to an
entire interest-rate path for all future contingencies, the gains from commitment could
be reaped without cost. However, this is not a realistic option for a central bank.4
First, future shocks cannot be described with suﬃcient precision to announce a shock-
dependent interest-rate path.5 Second, at the time when a contingent interest-rate path
is executed, it might be diﬃcult to identify which shock has actually occurred. Third,
it may be diﬃcult to agree on a contingent future path for interest rates if monetary
policy is conducted by a committee. Fourth, if decision-makers are approaching the
end of their term, it is hard to see how they could forecast the future decisions of their
successors, especially if they do not know who they will be.
What if the central bank settled for less and provided simple non-contingent policy
guidance? Then the ﬁrst and second objections no longer apply, while the third and
fourth remain valid. Moreover, non-contingent forecasts on the central bank’s future
policy have one additional drawback: central banks may become boxed in and lose
some of their ﬂexibility in responding to unforeseen shocks.
Why might deviations from interest-rate projections be costly? First, the central bank
needs to explain forecast deviations caused by unforeseen events. Some shocks (for
4Goodhart (2001) notes that “the idea of trying to choose a complete time path by discretionary
choice seems entirely fanciful and counterproductive.” See also Blinder (2004) and Mishkin (2004).
5Gabaix (2005) argues that idiosyncratic movements of large ﬁrms are central to understanding
aggregate ﬂuctuations. This may make it particularly diﬃcult to describe shocks.
4example those aﬀecting the natural rate of output) may be very diﬃcult to explain.
Then it may be necessary to devote substantial resources to the search for hard-to-ﬁnd
evidence explaining a forecast deviation convincingly. If deviations cannot be made
plausible to the public and if forecasts are actually valuable for the conduct of monetary
policy in the future, then current forecast deviations may involve future costs because
the forecasts will be deemed irrelevant by economic agents. Second, frequent forecast
deviations may impair the central bank’s prestige. They may induce skepticism about
the central bank’s competence and may also endanger the re-appointment of monetary-
policy committee members.
However, it is important to note that the costs of forecast deviations, while reducing
the central bank’s ﬂexibility in responding to unforeseen developments, also enable
the central bank to pre-commit to a future policy course. If the optimal policy is not
time-consistent, this is desirable. Accordingly, forward guidance for monetary policy
involves a trade-oﬀ between gains from commitment and losses in ﬂexibility.
4 Assessment
In this section we compare the costs and beneﬁts of forward guidance on policy interest
rates for the scenarios where forward guidance is potentially desirable.
4.1 Commitment in an Inﬂation-Bias Framework
In the framework set out in Kydland and Prescott (1977) the central bank targets an
output level that is higher than the level sustainable in the long run. As the central
bank cannot commit credibly to a low inﬂation rate, inﬂation is ineﬃciently high.
Several ways of alleviating this problem have been proposed in the literature, including
delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker (see Rogoﬀ (1985))
and reputation-building (see Barro and Gordon (1983)). Forward guidance represents
another option for avoiding an inﬂation bias.
In the Appendix we consider an inﬂation-bias framework in which a central bank
announces future values of the monetary policy instrument. The central bank’s forecast
5on its future policy serves as a future intermediate target and thus alleviates the central
bank’s credibility problem.6 We show that for suﬃciently small costs from forecast
deviations and thus a low degree of commitment, the gains from commitment make
forward guidance desirable. If however these costs are very large, the central bank
cannot respond optimally to shocks, so forward guidance is detrimental.
4.2 Commitment in a New Keynesian Model
Gersbach and Hahn (2008) examine the trade-oﬀ between gains from commitment
and losses in ﬂexibility that may be caused by forward guidance in a dynamic New
Keynesian framework. They consider four scenarios. First, the central bank publishes a
projection about the interest rate in the next period (short-term interest-rate forecast).
Second, the central bank announces its interest-rate projection for the next period but
one (medium-term interest-rate forecast). Third, the central bank publishes a forecast
of inﬂation in the next period (short-term inﬂation forecast). The fourth scenario
centers on inﬂation projections for the next period but one (medium-term inﬂation
forecast).
Gersbach and Hahn (2008) show that short-term projections are always harmful. As
forecasts concerning the next period do not aﬀect current expectations about inﬂation
in that period, no gains from commitment arise. But in the subsequent period the
central bank is boxed in by its announcement and is less willing to respond to shocks
in a socially optimal manner.
Medium-term interest-rate and inﬂation forecasts are potentially more favorable, as the
forecasting horizon is extensive enough for inﬂation expectations to adjust. Gersbach
and Hahn (2008) show that gains from commitment never outweigh losses in ﬂexibil-
ity where interest-rate forecasts are concerned. By contrast, medium-term inﬂation
forecasts are desirable if the degree of commitment to these announcements is not too
high.
6Other models where the central bank is committed to previous announcements include Cukierman
and Liviatan (1991) and Cukierman (2000). Gersbach and Hahn (2006) compare monetary targeting
and inﬂation targeting if the central bank is committed to the respective targets. Rogoﬀ (1985)
examines whether interest rates are desirable as intermediate targets.
64.3 Commitment in a Liquidity Trap
Many authors have noted that in the presence of deﬂation or a liquidity trap it may be
necessary for the central bank to commit to expansionary policy in the future.7 This will
increase inﬂation expectations and thus reduce the real interest rate, which is necessary
to avoid a deﬂationary spiral. However, it is unclear whether a commitment to zero
interest rates for some time is actually suﬃcient to increase inﬂation expectations
and thus to induce a low level for long-term real interest rates.8 Commitment to an
unusually high inﬂation or price-level target9 maintained for a considerable time (and
perhaps achieved by unconventional policy measures) seems more appropriate.
4.4 Revelation of Information through Forward Guidance
Forward guidance may also be interpreted as a means of communicating private central-
bank information. From a social perspective the question arises whether the central
bank should in fact communicate its private information. Though the theoretical ﬁnd-
ings on the welfare eﬀects of central-bank transparency are not unanimous, we assume
for the rest of our discussion that transparency is desirable.10 The next question is
whether forward guidance on the future path of interest rates is an appropriate way of
revealing information.
If forward guidance is used to reveal information on the central bank’s objectives or
the state of the economy, we have to remember that information about future policy
decisions and the central bank’s estimate of future economic shocks will usually be
non-veriﬁable. Accordingly, an important issue is whether the information will be
credible.
Why might forward guidance used to reveal the central bank’s private information
not be credible? First, if current inﬂation depends on expected future inﬂation (as in
standard forward-looking models), the central bank has an incentive to choose forward
7See Krugman (1998), among others.
8See Orphanides and Wieland (2000).
9For an extensive discussion see Svensson (2006).
10Gersbach (1998) ﬁrst showed that transparency in monetary policy may involve losses in terms of
welfare. For surveys of this literature see Geraats (2002) and Hahn (2002).
7guidance suggesting that inﬂation will be on target in the future, as this will have a
beneﬁcial eﬀect on current inﬂation. Second, the central bank may be reluctant to
reveal a future inﬂation path that leads the public to conclude that a ﬁnancial crisis is
likely. Third, the central bank may not be willing to reveal a high weight on the output
target or an output target that exceeds the natural level. These credibility problems
severely limit the use of forward guidance as a means of disclosing information.11
Nevertheless, it is possible for some information to be transmitted. First, forward
guidance may represent cheap talk, i.e. the central bank is not committed at all to
previous announcements and incurs no costs if it deviates. In this case, a transmission
of precise information is impossible if there are incentives for the central bank to
misrepresent its information. However, cheap talk could be used to reveal some vague
information (see Stein (1989), who applies the mechanism developed by Crawford and
Sobel (1982) to central-bank communication).12
Second, for the reasons discussed earlier, forecast deviations could be costly, which
would make the forecasts credible to some extent. Then two problems would arise. The
central bank loses some of its ﬂexibility in responding to unforeseen developments in the
future, as it will ﬁnd it costly to deviate substantially from previous announcements.
In addition, signaling costs will occur. Such costs arise because the interest-rate path
desired by the central bank may not signal the information the central bank wants
to reveal. The central bank thus needs to adjust the interest-rate projection. If it
is committed to these projections to some extent, this will lead to suboptimal policy
in the future. In this case it would be desirable to announce the private information
directly,13 provided this is feasible.
To sum up, if forward guidance represents cheap talk, then it may convey useful infor-
mation. However, its precision is limited by credibility problems. If the central bank
11Although we have assumed that a general adoption of transparency would be socially beneﬁcial
from an ex-ante perspective, this does not imply that revealing information truthfully will be in the
central bank’s interest in every possible situation in the future.
12For an interesting discussion of the instances where cheap talk can be used to transmit information
see Farrell and Rabin (1996).
13For example, the central bank’s projections of future shocks will be credible to some extent if
future deviations of these shocks from their projected values are costly to the central bank.
8is somewhat committed to its forecasts, then a direct publication of the central bank’s
information would be preferable.
5 Conclusions
We have argued that forward guidance regarding the future path of policy interest
rates can be either viewed as a means of commitment or as a means of communicating
private information. If forward guidance is used to disclose private information and
represents cheap talk, imprecise forward guidance, like the ECB’s use of code words,
may be informative.
If forward guidance is used to create commitment, costs of forecast deviations are a
necessary prerequisite for making forward guidance credible to some extent. The central
bank then faces a trade-oﬀ between gains from commitment and losses in ﬂexibility.
We show that in an inﬂation-bias framework, the gains from commitment are suﬃcient
to make the publication of future interest rates worthwhile, unless the deviation costs
are very high. By contrast, in a New Keynesian framework Gersbach and Hahn (2008)
show that interest-rate projections are detrimental.14
In the Appendix we have shown, for a simple inﬂation-bias framework, that the de-
sirability of forward guidance depends on the deviation costs and hence on the degree
of commitment to forecasts. The diﬀerent practices of central banks with respect to
forward guidance and changes therein can be associated with diﬀerent degrees of com-
mitment. For example, by attaching large error bands to forecasts, a central bank can
attempt to reduce its commitment to forecasts over and against the case where only
point forecasts are made public. The ECB’s traﬃc-light system can also be interpreted
as a system with a low value in deviation costs. While this enables central banks to
retain ﬂexibility, they may also forgo some of the gains from commitment.
It is crucial to note that the socially optimal degree of commitment may not be constant
over time. If the future economic development is highly uncertain, i.e. shocks are
14However, their framework can be used to support the publication of inﬂation projections.
9very large, then the losses from less ﬂexibility in responding to shocks may be severe.
Therefore a low level of commitment may be desirable. In a similar vein, there may
be times when commitment is particularly valuable, for example in the presence of a
liquidity trap. Hence the optimal disclosure practice will vary over time and across
central banks. These considerations may explain why diﬀerent central banks choose
very diﬀerent approaches to forward guidance, and why their communication policies
have changed substantially in the past.
10A Forward Guidance and the Classic Time-Inconsistency
Problem
A.1 Set-up
We consider a very simple model with a neoclassical Phillips curve
y = y0 + π − π
e + ε, (1)
where we use π and y to denote inﬂation and output. Inﬂation expectations are de-
noted by πe. Parameter y0 represents the natural rate of output and ε is a normally
distributed supply shock with mean zero and variance σ2
ε.
The IS curve is given by
y = y0 − (i − π
e − r) + µ, (2)
where i is the interest rate chosen by the central bank; r > 0 is the natural real rate of
interest. Variable µ represents a normally distributed demand shock with mean zero
and variance σ2
µ. It is uncorrelated with ε.
Moreover, we assume a quadratic function for social losses
L = π
2 + a(y − y0 − ∆)
2, (3)
where a > 0 represents the relative signiﬁcance of the output target. In the tradition
of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), we assume ∆ > 0. As
a consequence the socially optimal level of output, y0 + ∆, is higher than its natural
level y0.15
The central bank publishes a forecast of its policy instrument, i.e. the interest rate
i. We use iP to denote this projection. Following Gersbach and Hahn (2008), we
introduce a new component into the central bank’s loss function. We assume that
the central bank faces quadratic costs incurred by forecast deviations. Formally, the
central bank’s losses can be written as
L
CB = π




15For example, in the presence of distortionary taxation the socially optimal level is higher than the
level sustainable in the long run.




which increase in the size of forecast deviations. The size of these costs depends on
parameter b (b ≥ 0), which can be interpreted as the degree to which the central
bank is committed to its forecasts. For b = 0 we obtain the standard case because
announcements represent cheap talk when deviations are costless.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The central bank announces the forecast iP.
2. The public forms rational inﬂation expectations πe.
3. Nature chooses the shocks ε and µ.
4. The central bank chooses the interest rate i.
A.2 Solution
We solve the model by backward induction. As a ﬁrst step, we compute the central
bank’s optimal choice of i, for given πe and iP. Inserting (1) into (4) yields
L
CB = (y − y0 + π
e − ε)




Using (2), we obtain
L
CB = (−(i − π
e − r) + µ + π
e − ε)
2 + a(−(i − π




Maximization with respect to i gives
−(i − π
e − r) + µ + π
e − ε + a(−(i − π
e − r) + µ − ∆) + b(i
P − i) = 0.
This equation can be easily solved for i
i =
πe + r + µ + πe − ε + a(πe + r + µ − ∆) + biP
1 + a + b
. (5)
Now we turn to the public’s inﬂation expectations as a function of the interest-rate
projection iP. Using ie = πe+r, we can solve (5) for the public’s inﬂation expectations
as a function of iP
π
e =
a∆ − b(iP − r)
1 − b
. (6)
12Using (1), (2), (5), and (6), we obtain16
y = y0 +
b
1 + a + b
µ +
1




1 + a + b
µ −
a + b











1 + a + b
µ −
1












Equation (7) represents the expression for y given in the main text. By inserting (7),
(8), and (9) into (4), taking expected values, and computing the derivative with respect
to iP, we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition with the solution
i




Combining (7), (8), (9), and (10) yields
y = y0 +
b
1 + a + b
µ +
1




1 + a + b
µ −
a + b





i = r +
1 + a
1 + a + b
µ −
1





A.3 Forward Guidance and Welfare
Expected social losses can be computed by inserting (11) and (12) into (3) and taking
expected values. We obtain
EL =
(1 + a)b2




a + (a + b)2











The ﬁrst two summands represent the losses incurred by shocks. These terms are
increasing in b. Intuitively, announcing a projection for the future interest rate reduces
the central bank’s ﬂexibility in responding to these shocks. The third term on the
right-hand side of (14) can be split into two components, namely a∆2 and
a2
(1+b)2∆2.
16Note that the interest rate chosen by the central bank, which is given by (9), is decreasing in iP for
b < 1. A similar ﬁnding has led Rogoﬀ (1985) to the conclusion that an intermediate interest target
is not advantageous. However, (5) implies that i is an increasing function of iP for a given level of
πe. The apparently implausible equation (9) can be understood in the following way: An increase in
the projected inﬂation rate can be interpreted as a commitment by the central bank to ﬁght inﬂation.
This reduces inﬂation expectations, which does not make high interest rates necessary.
13First, a∆2 stands for the unavoidable losses caused by the fact that the central bank
cannot boost output above its natural rate. Second,
a2
(1+b)2∆2 are additional losses
arising because the central bank produces an ineﬃciently high rate of inﬂation in its
ultimately futile attempt to boost output above its natural level. These losses could be
avoided if the central bank targeted the natural level of output. Interestingly, the term
a2
(1+b)2∆2 is decreasing in b. Hence higher levels of b imply that the central bank can
commit more eﬀectively to keeping inﬂation low. As a consequence, it can overcome
the time-inconsistency problem to some extent.
To sum up, the publication of monetary-policy inclinations involves a trade-oﬀ. It di-
minishes the central bank’s ﬂexibility in responding to shocks, which is socially detri-
mental. However, it provides the central bank with a means of committing itself, which
may be socially desirable.









2 < 0. (15)
We thus arrive at the important observation that for suﬃciently small values of b
the announcement of policy forecasts is socially desirable. It is relatively easy to see
that for high values of b losses caused by lower ﬂexibility may outweigh gains from
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